Are you the Tenkin? Oh. We were just waiting for the Tenkin. Amade to Manjushri, Bodhisattva of Great Wisdom. May His presence and compassion sustain us now. This last Tuesday, the day after the last class, And the Chinese tradition was the Memorial Day for Nagarjuna on the lunar calendar. So this is an auspicious time of year to study Nagarjuna. This is a class on Nagarjuna, I suppose, even though we haven't really gotten into Nagarjuna yet. So time is running short. Maybe today. We'll see. And it's the full moon. Nagarjuna is sometimes manifested as a full moon.

[01:14]

We need to invoke Manjushri's presence. This is difficult and we're going deeper into it. Manjushri can help us open to his perfect wisdom. One saying that I find encouraging that I hope you might also, is Nagarjuna's disciple Aryadeva or Kanadeva. We say Kanadaiva Dayosho. He did a lot of commentary on Nagarjuna-inspired writings. He said, Those of little merit would not even have doubts that the self inherently exists. Those of little merit would not even begin to doubt that the self inherently exists.

[02:27]

They would just assume. Those of little merit wouldn't even question this fact. But those saying in reverse, you could say... those with some merit, might start to doubt this inherently existent self, even without fully realizing it, right? Just to doubt, it's kind of a funny way of talking, right? But to even have a little bit of doubt that the self exists the way it seems to, well, that's the next line. Even just the suspicion that the self is empty of inherent existence wrecks the seeds of samsara. It kind of like ruins the seeds of this driven cycle of suffering. Just the suspicion that things may not be the way they seem. You could say, well, does it completely wreck the seeds? That's kind of this line.

[03:28]

It's just the doubt. Actually, the seeds start to become ruined. even though there's many seeds already sprouting, we could say, and those ones are still causing trouble. So this is, I find, a really encouraging statement, that even if we just show up at such a discussion, there's probably already at least some doubt that the Self exists the way it seems to. So this is good news. Maybe the seeds of samsara are already wrecked for all of us. just to show up here. So, some various other things before... The plan is actually to... I started getting into Nagarjuna's chapter today, but there's some loose ends that I feel are really important to mention. Things from the past classes.

[04:31]

So, one thing is that... I think a really essential point is that this view of the inherently existent self, sometimes it's talked about that it's like destroyed, or abolished or obliterated, the view, and there's maybe some merit in speaking that way, but I think more helpful is that the view doesn't need to be destroyed, Definitely the inherently existent self doesn't need to be destroyed because it's not there. It's not something to destroy. It can't be destroyed because it's not there in the first place. So this is important to remember when we start feeling the sense of it and like, okay, now I've got to destroy this self. That very energy to destroy something that's not there is kind of the fuel to keep it going, actually. So we could say destroy the view.

[05:32]

that it exists, but I think even better is to actually just understand how the view doesn't make sense. So this is very, you know, without moving a particle, sometimes say in Zen, without changing anything, right, just seeing. It's a seeing. This is why we must invoke Mahanjushri. It's a shift of understanding. There's the appearance of the view continuing to arise, but we really understand it in a different way so that it actually can cause no more harm because we don't believe in the appearance. So this is through wisdom, not through destruction. And I think a really great metaphor for this that many people have probably heard but continues to impress me with its many aspects is about the snake in the road.

[06:36]

So if you've already heard this, please try to open to the wonder of this metaphor. Again, it's a metaphor, so it's not really exactly pointing at what it's representing, but it's, I think, very accurate in many ways. So the story is that we're walking along, the path at night, it's dark, and you see a snake on the road and jump back in fear at the snake. Many snakes are poisonous and cause harm. And so we're still really afraid, but now we're going to move along the path, so maybe we've got to get closer and maybe try to, with a long stick, kind of push it out of the way or something. And so as we get closer and we're starting to look at how is the snake going to move next, and it's dark, right? So it's hard to see. Maybe we pull out a flashlight to look at it.

[07:44]

We could say this is like the wisdom light shining through the darkness, shining on the snake, and oh, it's actually just a rope on the path. It's actually not a snake at all. It was a... The mind played this trick in the dark. And then I think the beauty of the metaphor, you can see how, well, it's not the way it appeared, but in this particular case, all the fear and the mental agitation caused by the view of the snake immediately dissipates, immediately is gone when seeing it's a rope. And it almost seems like it seems silly, right, at the time of seeing... It's instant, right? It's like sudden enlightenment, you could say. And in a very kind of non-special kind of way. It's just accurately seeing, oh, this is just a rope. The fear is gone.

[08:45]

Maybe there's still like, if there's some adrenaline flowing, maybe the adrenaline keeps going for a little bit just because the body is working that way. It's still pumping. But it's... It's basically the fear is gone. It's total relief. And we can even look back at like, oh, those few minutes that I was totally afraid of the snake now seem silly. Like, what was I afraid of? That was just... We can almost laugh at ourself, right? And it's not like a big problem that I was afraid. It's just kind of silly when seeing how it is. So I think it's valuable to contemplate this metaphor. And... This is an example of how the snake is not destroyed or obliterated, right? It's just seeing for what it is, the fact that it's basically not a snake. It's just a rope. Nothing needs to change about the snake, just our way of seeing. Also, like waking up from a dream, almost same example.

[09:51]

it's a nightmare, right, and all the afflictions and the fear and the suffering and the dream, when we wake up, it's like, maybe again, it takes a little bit to really believe, like, was it really just a dream? Because my body's, like, sweating and, you know, this kind of thing. But actually, no, you start to see, like, no, it really, like, it was just a dream. And, like, maybe the relief. is instant or the relief takes a few minutes. Even though like a dream and a snake seem so real, as real as this view of the inherently existent self. Also like a reflection in a mirror. Look at the face and this really seems like a real face, like it's really me in the mirror, but we know it's just a reflection. or a mirage, right? There's all these great metaphors.

[10:54]

Mirage really looks like water, but when you get close to it, same with the snake, you get close, and you shine the light, and you become very intimate with this seemingly inherently existing self, and by getting very close to it, then you can see its nature. The mirage of water, once you get close, it disappears. Yes. It seems like most people, if they don't look at that, they live their whole life. Yeah, yeah, yeah, exactly. So it is, although in a way nothing changes, and it's very, it could be a very, it's just a very subtle mind shift, right, without some great effort to like squash the self. Not at all like that. In fact, as I said, that's almost like that kind of energy It fuels the view. It's almost like in order to destroy it, if we're thinking we can destroy it already, we're believing that it's there to destroy.

[12:03]

So it's subtly seen in a different way. Also, some more on the five skandhas, the five aggregates that are grasped as a self. This could be a topic for a whole other class series or something, the way these five work together. I think it's helpful to see. And for those who weren't here last week, we kind of spent some time with these five. But just to clarify a little bit more, the third skanda of conception and the fifth of consciousness are quite related. But we could say the third, conception, or we translate perception in the Heart Sutra, but I think conception or discrimination is better translation. It's kind of like an indirect perception or something, or a conceptually mediated perception, whereas consciousness is more like a direct perception.

[13:14]

So in a way you could say consciousness comes first, and then... And in fact, if you remember the story about consciousness, it arises dependent on an organ, a sense organ, which could be the mind organ, and the sense object, or mind object. Dependent on the organ and the object, consciousness arises. That's the story of the birth of consciousness. Now, conception depends on the organ, the object, and the consciousness. are working together, dependent on those three, then conception can arise. So you can see that conception is like a further step after consciousness. Yeah, when we talk about like direct perception, it really seems to be talking about the consciousness skandha, not the perception, what we call perception. And then conception, the third skandha, samnya.

[14:18]

is a little bit more conceptually mediated. Yes. So it says in months just like a conception is where the memory is held. How does that work? I don't know if it's where memory is held, but... It's more like, it's also sometimes called identification. So to identify things is based on memory, which is maybe woven through the fourth Skanda too. So we could almost say conception depends partly on memory in order to conceive of something as blue. Another way to say it is, like for blue, for a sense perception, a direct sense perception of blue, of the color blue, without even knowing it, there can be this, without conceiving of it as blue, you can have a direct sense perception of blue, which is the consciousness skanda, and then...

[15:41]

When the conception of blue comes up, then it's like, that is blue. This is blue. Is that discrimination? Yeah, and that's discrimination or the third skanda. Or labeling, even. This term, name and form, refers to form as the form skanda, and name, actually... is technically the other four Skandhas. Nama, Rupa, name and form, is another term for the five Skandhas. Rupa is the form Skanda, and Nama, or name, is the other four combined. But you could say particularly its name would be this function of the conception Skanda. It's the kind of naming function. And they also say that You know, all these other forms, Skanda has ten dharmas in it, and consciousness Skanda has six dharmas, but the feeling has three, and mental formations has like 51 or so.

[16:54]

But the other two, feeling and conception, just have one. No, feeling has three, actually. But feeling and conception are these, they single them out as these important dharmas, As they say, this is another way of talking about the root of samsara or suffering, is particularly these two skandhas. The feeling skanda is the basis for one type of grasping, or attachment is grasping sense pleasure. So this is based on the second skanda, feeling. There's feeling and then there's... There's a grasping, that feeling, so that's one form of bondage. And then another kind of grasping is grasping at views, like views of inherent existence. And that mainly arises from the third skanda. So those two skandhas, the Abhidharma Kosha says, particularly give rise to suffering.

[17:58]

Grasping, yeah, grasping, which is actually what suffering... The definition of suffering is grasping. So these are just some elaborations on the skandhas. So here's another kind of story about particularly how the workings, I find it's important to look at this view of the inherently existing self. Is it just some magical emanation, or how can we explain how this thing works? And the five skandhas explain it. And according to the story of the five skandhas, there's nothing outside the five skandhas. It includes the whole world, as I said last week, particularly the experience of a person. So these... So we're looking at this view of the inherently existent self and the grasping of that.

[19:00]

Here's a story of how the five skandhas explain how that works. It's a kind of psychological model of this process that actually there's no self in it. It's this illusory thing. But you could say in terms of the skandhas, this view, the view of the inherently existent self, And there's other false views too, but this would be a false view, and particularly this one's called satkaya drishti, is the view of the inherently existent self of the person, which literally means the view of the transitory collection, or the impermanent collection of skandhas. You could say, well, viewing impermanent skandhas doesn't seem like a problem, but it's kind of shorthand for the view, the false view of the transitory collection of skandhas as being an inherently existing self.

[20:02]

Anyway, that's what the Buddha called it, the view of the transitory collection, literally. So this view is one of the dharmas in these 51 dharmas or phenomena in the fourth skanda, samskara skanda, formations skanda, this is one of the 51, is view, false view. So there it is, right there, this false view of the inherently existent self. That false view is one of the phenomena of the five skandhas. This is not saying that the inherently existent self is one of the dharmas of the five skandhas. It's saying the view The false view of this existent self is one of the dharmas. Does that make sense? So this view is locatable in the fourth skanda. And it's conceptually imputed, dependent on all five skandhas.

[21:12]

So this view, this is kind of this dynamic thing. It's a Dharma in the fourth Skanda, but when you start to examine what it is to describe this view, it's the view of the inherently existent self that depends on all the other five Skandhas. It says, last week, you know, you heard that all the five Skandhas are completely interdependent and all working together. They can't really be singled out, and this would be an example of that. We're singling out this Dharma, seemingly, from the fourth Skanda, but then we see what it is when we examine it, is it's this view that depends, that uses all five skandhas. Almost like the five skandhas are like the raw material for this imagined self. And then it's also this snake metaphor, which not only in Buddhism, but different Indian traditions use this metaphor because it works so well.

[22:16]

But this is, one story is that the view, this view, this drishti dharma in the four skandhas is like the mind conceiving the snake, and ignorance, avidya, you know, basic ignorance, delusion, which is actually not one of the dharmas in the five skandhas. It's almost like it's too big. It just encompasses the whole picture. but that ignorance is like the dimness surrounding the rope. So, you know, these are a little bit technical, but I think it helps to, you know, flesh this out a little bit and see how technically the difference between these things. So this is how they talk about the view that's one of the dharmas is like the mind that conceives the snake, this false view, and the ignorance This basic ignorance is like the dimness or darkness around the rope that keeps us from seeing the true nature of the rope.

[23:24]

And keeps us from knowing our view as false. And keeps us from knowing our view as false, yeah. It's like the whole thing is like this murky picture we can't see clearly. And that one's kind of like that basic ignorance or not knowing, avidya. But we think we see clearly. We think, yeah, we grasp our view. We grasp the false view. Like we can grasp all these dharmas in the five skandhas. We can grasp all the skandhas. In particular, we could say we're grasping this view as true, without even realizing it. You say, well, I'm not really grasping it because I know it's not true. But like on some very deep, innate way, we're actually, without... Even knowing that we're doing it, a lot of grasping is not conscious. We're unconsciously grasping that view. We're holding it as true. So you could say, with all these dharmas, if the dharmas aren't grasped as a self or grasped in any way, then they're just arising and ceasing dharmas.

[24:32]

So we could even, with the view, false view dharma, if it's not grasped, then it's just another arising dharma. Dharma just means phenomena. It could be translated as things or phenomena. Dharma, kind of sometimes in English we say with a small d, dharmas are phenomena. And dharma with a capital D means like Buddha's teaching or the truth. So it's this really dynamic word. Dharma has these two kind of different meanings, pretty different meanings. So Abhidharma is like the kind of study of all the dharmas, phenomena. Yeah, almost opposite in a way. Well, not exactly opposite, but yeah, there's no word in English that covers both those terms.

[25:35]

So then we have this view from the fourth skanda. And then conception, the third skanda, conceives of the view as it kind of like labels it and like this is myself, you know, that kind of feeling of this is myself as a kind of conception of the view. So I could say it's hard to pull this stuff apart. We can't really, but the third skanda, you know, the maybe basic thing is the view of the inherently existing self, then conception, which, you know, from the fourth skanda produces the view, dependent on all five skandhas. The view is, you know, the view of the self dependent on all the five skandhas. And then the third skanda in particular gives rise to a conception of the, so we can know it as this is my self.

[26:39]

Is the fourth skanda called mental formation? Yes. Mm-hmm. And so it's the conception, third time, the conception identifies the view of the inherently existent self, but then it also reflects correctly on these reasonings that refute inherently existent self. So it's important that conception is not just this problem that's causing all the trouble. We have to actually use conception in this kind of reasoning. So it causes trouble, but also it's what conceptually starts to, like this whole discussion is kind of in the realm of conception, where these are a bunch of conceptions that are being used to investigate how this whole process works. So we're using a conceptual model, we're using the third skanda to do this investigation, to kind of... to come up with reasonings that start to, um, start to break down our holding to this view of the inherently existent self.

[27:51]

And then, um, and then when we see that the absence of that view, then actually, um, consciousness, the fifth skanda, can actually perceive, indirectly perceive, the, um, uh, There can be actual conceptual consciousness, too. So where these things, dividing lines between these things, is hard to say. But there can be a conceptually mediated consciousness or awareness, kind of an indirect awareness that is the fifth skanda of emptiness, the emptiness of the inherently existent self. And then there can eventually, after a kind of conceptual version of that, then there can actually be a non-conceptual consciousness that perceives, that directly perceives the absence of the inherently existent self. And that would be like direct realization of emptiness of the self.

[28:56]

So that was a complicated story. And I don't know if you could follow. There's six kinds. So there's the five senses, and there's also mental perception, conception, and there's six kinds of conception, in a way, and there's also six kinds of consciousness. There's a mental one. And they say, actually, with conception, the third skanda, that... The sense conceptions are very kind of weak and not so active. There are sense conceptions, technically, that like kind of a knowing that this is blue, for example, in just a sensory way. But mainly it's the mental conception that's the one that's emphasized and really does most of the work.

[30:00]

Whereas in terms of consciousness, the sense consciousnesses are maybe stronger than sense conception. Yeah. The sense consciousnesses, the fifth skanda in the sensory realm is more, maybe most of our experience of the sensory realm is referring to the consciousness skanda. Although they do talk about these sense conceptions too. The story can get very complicated and could be seen in many ways, and even studying different versions of it sometimes seem contradictory. But I don't think we need to work out all the details, just to know that it's this very dynamic process of the mind. And actually, this whole process of delusion and enlightenment can be explained in various degrees of accuracy in terms of the five skandhas and all these... dharmas of mind.

[31:03]

And the more breakdown of dharmas describing these different aspects, the more it's the whole point of it actually, the point of Abhidharma, alineating 75 or 100 dharmas and describing them thoroughly and how they work together. You could say the main function of this is actually to see how this whole process of a living being and a experiencing the world can happen without like a solid me. It's just all these factors of mind working together beautifully and creating these illusions that it's not like that, it's actually just this one me. And also these are all the different factors that we can grasp as a me. Either the whole collection of them together, which is maybe most common, or individually. Like just the view, for example, just grasping that one dharma is almost like grasping the whole picture.

[32:06]

It seems that time is a kind of conception. We have a conception of time. mean of just being like totally present? Well, I think we could have a conception of the timeless present, and also we could have a direct experience, a consciousness of timeless awareness. Could be like the sixth skanda, mental consciousness, completely in the present. Almost like the conception of time is just not operating at that moment. Yeah, but yeah, time would be a But we wouldn't know it. Yeah, at that time we wouldn't. Well, we could say, depends what we mean by know, if there's like a direct, sometimes consciousness is translated as knowing, like a direct cognizing or knowing, either slightly conceptual knowing or non-conceptual knowing.

[33:28]

But when we start labeling it as, this is the timeless awareness of the present moment, that would maybe be the conception coming back in and in to kind of label it and identify. But yeah, it's tricky. I mean, you spend a long time studying how all these things work and working out the stories. But I find particularly, usually when they get into these reasonings about refuting the inherently existing self, They don't spend much time describing the process of, well, how exactly does this thing work? It's just this illusion that we're trying to see through. But I find in meditation that that question comes up when starting to look at it. Well, it seems so real. How is it coming to be? The question of when we're looking at how the view doesn't make sense, my mind starts asking, I've noticed... when meditating on this stuff, it's not satisfied with just, it's an illusion. It wants to know, how does this illusion work?

[34:31]

Because it seems so real. Tell me a story about how the illusion can come to be from the five skandhas. And so these stories alleviate some of that doubt, some of that kind of... It must be real because it feels so real and it's just there. But then you start to see how, oh, it can be produced in this way, using these skandhas to tell these stories. I find helpful myself. But if you don't need to do that, maybe just as well. Yeah. This might be a little bit tangential, but it makes me think about it. Have there been any writing where you've been commenting on a certain idea of the physical, chemical reactions in the brain and how that relates to these different things? Because it seems almost like there are certain things happening in the brain chemically or synapse connections that are almost directly related to these different lungs and cognitions.

[35:35]

Yeah, yeah. Well, I think the Buddha didn't talk about that because they didn't know so much science, but maybe modern psychophysiology and Well, actually, I think that in some way, the Skandas are artificially created. It's a model. It's a model, and not really meant to be taken, like, literally. Like, this is a sum total of reality, because it's really a oneness. All the Skandas are really one thing altogether, but in a way to talk about it, you artificially, intellectually break it up. So they're not really talking about, oh, this is grounded, and, you know, the subconscious of this is grounded, and it's just not what they're doing at all. Maybe I've heard something like that. Yeah, so I don't know. There's this book Zen in the brain. Yeah, part of the brain that generates the sense of self. Yeah, so there's studies in this kind of thing that I think are interesting and could be helpful in terms of practice.

[36:38]

I think also just to almost pacify this or help us understand how it's really not, it's really just created by the mind or in this case the brain maybe. And it's functional. And it's functional, too. Yeah, it's useful. So that's why, yeah. Continuous. Right. Like I brought up this example of evolution, which the Buddha didn't talk about, you know, the viable evolutionary function of the sense of self. But again, I think that helps explain why there could be this imagined thing that helps. And again, why we don't need to obliterate it, but just see it for what it is. And actually, again, there's this story that the appearance of the inherently existent self continues to arise after completely giving up the view that it inherently exists. The appearance of the inherent existence continues to arise until this eighth stage bodhisattva, for example.

[37:45]

Well, according to scripture, right? So these wonderful enlightenment realizations, like stream enter, or all these early bodhisattva stages, and kensho, and these kinds of things, after these so-called enlightenment experiences, the view will continue to appear. But the big difference is that it's really seen as just that, an appearance. And not just like the idea of like, oh, yeah, I know it's in appearance, but on some deep level, like I'm still holding it. It's kind of like, so this is the difference. It's appearing, and I really can't grasp it anymore. It reminds me of a story of a well-known scientist, I don't know, who was schizophrenic. The story was around a while ago. He had...

[38:48]

hallucinations. He would see his little sister making faces and people. Don't you remember the story? Beautiful mind. And in the end, after he felt that he had seen how the whole thing worked, he ceased to believe. Yeah, that's right. Yeah. Yeah. And wasn't it like as he related to them, they would disappear faster or something, as I recall? He could see them disappear. Yeah. He kind of related to them kindly. Instead of like, not those illusions again. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. So that's a great example. Yeah. Yeah, that image. Yeah. Oh, and just while you were speaking, I was thinking of another movie, too, about the chemical part, is that what the bleep is happening, you know, is kind of, I think, helpful.

[39:59]

It's a kind of modern science view on, you know, how the chemical body, like, creates total suffering. And by understanding it, in the movie, right, it's... Yeah, yeah, yeah, it's kind of like that. And most like the woman in the movie kind of had sort of like an enlightenment through understanding chemical workings, in a way. What the bleep is happening? What the bleep do we know? People made it as followers of this ancient spirit. What was the spirit called? Ramtha. Ramtha. Let's see. So, also I wanted to just mention this point that we got into a little bit about how, you know, this kind of like unborn, undying, you know, clear awareness that can never be destroyed, like the self with a capital S, um...

[41:16]

You know, in other Indian schools they have this, and in Buddhism, I said, they have similar things. And if anyone went to this Tuesday night event with this Douglas Harding student workshop about, he's kind of like, I was thinking of this discussion when he's, you know, it's like there's this awareness that can't be harmed, and you can, tune into it right now, and it's like this is it, and you just like pull the, pull the borders off, and you just have this kind of open awareness, there's, and you don't, you know, this one that you, you can't see, this formless, um, colorless awareness, um, with no edges, or, and no, no birth and death even, right? It was the proposal. You can't see. Yeah, you can't see this one. You know, if you point, you can see all these things, right?

[42:17]

But if you point like this, you can't... The thing that you're pointing at, yeah, you can't see, and it has no form, and you can never... It's just awareness, right? And it's... All this stuff of our life is happening kind of in this sphere of this awareness, so that even though this stuff can be happening, the awareness, in a way, never changes and is never harmed by whatever's happening. I thought pretty good. It was pretty good. A very experiential kind of... How does that relate to you? Well, I was thinking, is this actually, at that time, is this the fifth Skanda that we're looking at? Is it mental consciousness? You know, the sixth consciousness of the fifth Skanda? Sometimes that's maybe what this is, this awareness. It seems like it's unborn and unceasing, but remember the story about Sati, the son of a fisherman, who said, as I understand the Buddha's teaching, it's this consciousness that goes on from life to life, right?

[43:22]

It's kind of like, and it's what experiences everything. And the Buddha said, no, Sati. This was last week's story, if you might remember. I never said consciousness is this continuous, unborn, undying awareness. Because consciousness, remember, depends on the organ and the object, and it dependently co-arises moment to moment. It seems continuous, but it's actually ceasing moment to moment and arising moment to moment. This is the story. And it's dependent on the body, for example. So when the body dies, actually, that fifth skanda doesn't continue moment to moment. So... So this is, you know, in this example of this awareness, and there's different Buddhist schools talk like this, including Zen, quite a bit. Often called bare awareness. Yeah, sometimes bare awareness, yeah. If we're saying bare awareness is enlightenment, which, for example, Dzogchen, Tibetan Buddhism starts sounding that way, but they're very clear about saying this is not the fifth skanda we're talking about.

[44:35]

So can we experience the difference between the fifth skanda and something that they would call non-dual perfect gnosis, like a jnana? So this is the question. And in this simple example, it kind of seems like, well, is this really this non-dual perfect gnosis of a Buddha that would just by... by like taking this mask off from this example, this workshop. That seems like kind of a stretch, but it could be the fifth skanda, in which case it's maybe not the complete picture. Although, I would say very helpful to just actually meditate by just kind of, you could say, resting in the fifth skanda of mental awareness, just being awareness, great meditation. Especially for, like, you know, paying attention to the mind would be like a meditation object. You're meditating on the... Six Consciousness. But it wouldn't be the whole story, because there's this non-dual knowing that's deeper.

[45:42]

And this is... You meditate on the Six Consciousness, this you and the Consciousness you meditate on? Is that what you mean by it's non-dual? Yeah, that would be one aspect of it, yeah, of it being dualistic. Yeah, there's you meditating on it. And yeah, yeah, right. There's like a slight, even if it's very just awareness, there might be this slight separation that there's something, somebody here, some very almost unconscious. Do you mean non-dual awareness is deeper than Rigpa? Well, I'm saying Rigpa would be this non-dual awareness. Rigpa is not the fifth skanda. Rigpa is a Dzogchen term. And interestingly, Rigpa is Tibetan translation for Sanskrit vidya, which is the opposite of avidya. Avidya is ignorance, or literally another kind of not knowing.

[46:46]

So this vidya is like a knowing. And in Chinese for avidya is mu myo, no light. So Rigpa would be like a light, the light of... non-dual awareness. No, I think we're getting into Dzogchen now, but in Rigpa there's no duality. It's non-dual knowing. But they also talk about it can be quite simple. It's not this really exalted state that's far away. We can experience it maybe quite easily. Because in fact, all of this stuff is not far away. This is why this, you know, this thing of even having this slight doubt about the way we think things are destroys these seeds of samsara.

[47:48]

As you could say, well, this is not, it's just seeing the rope, right? It's just... It's very subtle. This is the difficulty of it, I think. It's very subtle, and it's so not the way we usually see, but it's completely available. It's actually the way things actually are right now. It's just a matter of seeing clearly light. Maybe I won't read from this, but this is long. quote from the Lankavatara Sutra that proposes, which is one of the important Zen Sutras and mind-only origins, this Lankavatara Sutra. But they say Bodhidharma brought it. So it's a lot of Zen teachings are somewhat based on this. And this proposes that there's this Tathagatagarbha, this womb of...

[48:54]

the Buddha, or here they translate it as the matrix of one gone thus. So, and this is like, yeah? Is that the same as like Great Robe of Liberation? Great Robe of Liberation? Yeah, like in the morning. Maybe. Could be. We could see it that way. Or Buddha nature. It's another similar term. And in this Lakavatarasutra, it's equated with what we call the thoroughly established character. There's synonyms in this sutra. For those, again, studying the Sandhinomotana Sutra, this is this really wild kind of like derivative teaching. They're saying that actually the thoroughly established character is this Tathagadagarbha. And it's this like Buddha nature. And it's this, you know, endowed with all Buddha qualities. And it's... It's like a precious gem wrapped in a dirty cloth, you know, wrapped in the cloth of the five skandhas.

[50:00]

But it's this, like, pure Buddha mind, right? Permanent, stable, everlasting. And then, you know, the Bodhisattva asks, well, how is this Tathagata Garba not like the non-Buddhist propounding of a self? It sounds a lot like itself. And the Buddha goes on basically to say, like, no, it's actually, it's another word for emptiness. And the thoroughly established is emptiness and nirvana. And it's not something substantial, even though it has these Buddha, it's endowed with Buddha qualities and so on. So this is some of these Mahayana Sutras, right? And... So, and then, I thought this was interesting. Remember, the Sanjana Nirmocena Sutra said, I don't teach alaya to children for fear that they will take it as a self. Alaya, consciousness, which is also connected to this Tathagata-Garbha thing. This is another class series that we don't want to get into.

[51:02]

But anyway, in this sutra, the Buddha says, um, um, uh, the, um, So that children might avoid the fear of selflessness, the fear of emptiness of the self, I teach the state of non-conceptuality, the object of wisdom free from appearances. Isn't that interesting? In relation to the other, Alaya was taught not to children, didn't teach that to children for fear that they were taken as a self, This one, which is almost the same thing, but in a slightly different version, he does teach to children because it's so frightening to imagine just like no self at all. So let's have this kind of Buddha nature endowed. It's a positive thing. We can maybe hold in a way, but then we hold it and see it's nothing but emptiness, but it doesn't take everything away.

[52:08]

It gives something positive. So, um... This is a new book by Jeffrey Hopkins called The Essence of Other Emptiness. No, but it's got a big section in there, yeah. Maybe better translation than D.T. Suzuki's. And, um... It's got the, um... It's a short thing about the four schools, teaching of the four schools, and then the final... In Madhyamaka, the middle way school, there's, um... There's the standard Madhyamaka, teaching of emptiness, and then there's this thing called Other Emptiness, that's this kind of Tathagata Gara Buddha nature, positive version of Madhyamaka, and it has all the reasons delineating them. The Essence of Other Emptiness by Taranatha. And there's a huge, like, thousand-page version called Mountain Doctrine,

[53:10]

but also by Jeffrey Hopkins. So that's just the point about when we hear these Zen teachings and other Mahayana teachings about this unborn, undying awareness, and isn't that grasping the fifth Skanda as a self? This is why I mention this, because in the Mahayana there can be this non-dual Tathagadagarb or Buddha nature, I won't go into it more, but something beyond the five skandhas. Would you distinguish it from Hinduism when you're talking about the self? Similar, similar, but philosophically they refute the Hindu views, because even though they're very similar, in terms of the experience, probably quite similar, but...

[54:11]

Yeah, so it's these different philosophical views, and this one is proposed to be a more subtle view. And so, one time Master Lin Ji said to the assembly, there's a true person of no rank going in and out through the portals of your face. A true person of no rank or no position that's going in and out through... the five senses, or you could say, passing through the five skandhas, is true person of no rank. So this, you could say, is, that sounds like some essential self, right? True person, but true person of no rank. No, it's completely ungraspable, that true person, going in and out through the five skandhas and through the portals in your face. Most of our senses are up here. It's just a wonderful image. And then he says, if you people haven't seen it yet, look, look, investigate, investigate this issue.

[55:23]

And a monk comes forward and says, what is this true person of no rank? Linji grabs him and pulls him forward and says, speak, speak. And a monk hesitates. And then he pushes him away and says, a true person of no rank, what a dry piece of crap. So we could say, well, this true person of no rank is like this fifth type of self that, you know, on this list is the true self, right? The ultimate truth beyond existence and non-existence, the emptiness or absence of any kind of inherently existing self. manifested as joyful, compassionate, spontaneous freedom. So the true person of no rank is spontaneous freedom. So when Jesus says, speak, speak, he would say blueberry pie or something. But that hesitation is kind of like, even though the true person of no rank is there, it didn't manifest at that time.

[56:31]

true person in a no-rank could be like dry piece of crap. Okay, so, Nagarjuna. Before we actually get into the first verse. This is like the Lotus Sutra. This has all been setting the stage for the first verse of Nagarjuna. We talked a lot about the self, these different types of self. the five skandhas, because these are the two important items in the first verse. Now, the other point, briefly, in the first verse is this issue about sameness or difference. The first verse is if the self is the same, identical to the skandhas, it would have these certain issues, and if it were different, then it would have these issues. So what we're talking about, the self, in this first verse, is the inherently existent self. We don't even say the view, in this case, because we're talking about the philosophical concept of an inherently existent self.

[57:41]

If there were this inherently existent self, or actually anything that inherently exists, if you're comparing it to something else, It has to be identical or different from the thing you're comparing it to. So you might have to think about this a little bit. If this stool inherently exists, and we're comparing it to this chair, its relationship to the chair, if this inherently exists, it must be the same as the chair or different than the chair. This is a philosophical statement, yes. Um, yeah, and you have to see why, no, you have to understand why it's so, yes. But first, before we get into it, yeah, this is important. Um, you could also say, another way of talking about inherently existing is independent. If this thing exists independently, it means it doesn't depend on anything, right? Inherently existing means it doesn't depend on... Yeah, we see things as independent, actually.

[58:46]

If it were independent, um... it wouldn't depend on the chair, for example. It couldn't have a relationship with anything. Okay? So relationship is about interdependent. So that's why we usually say, well, it has to be independent of the chair. It means like separate from it, not the chair. It has to be not related, not dependent on the chair, not related in any way if it's independent. Or there could be this other possibility that could be identical to it Exactly identical. And then that would be okay. Because it's not in relationship to it, if it's identical, right? Completely separate is not in relationship. Completely identical is not in relationship. Does that make sense? What's that? Maybe. It was maybe related to that, but yeah, but this very specific point.

[60:11]

And so you might say, well, that's ridiculous to say that they could be the same. So let's take an example of this yurt, the yurt that we're in, and compare, if this yurt inherently existed, it would, let's compare it to its parts. floor and the wall and the top and the lights and so on. So if the yurt were inherently existent, it would have to be identical to its parts, which maybe it would be, right? We might see that way. Or completely different than its parts. Identical to the parts would mean that each part would be identical to a whole. That would be one thing that would start coming up. You're going to the next step now, starting to reason about it. If it were identical, what problems might there be? But before even going there, first we just have to see this fact that if the yurt were to be inherently existing, independent yurt, existing by way of its own character, from its own side, it would have to be identical to its parts, the floor and the wall and the ceiling, or it would have to be completely separate from its parts.

[61:32]

Because it couldn't depend on its parts. If it were dependent on its parts, it wouldn't be inherently existing, right? By definition, something that's inherently doesn't have any relationship. Right, so let's say independent then for now instead of inherently existing. If the yurt were independently existing, it couldn't depend on its parts, right? Independently, yeah, but what about inherently? Same, same thing, yeah. That wouldn't exist anymore. It doesn't mean the same, but it comes down to the same. It's hard to see. Yeah, I agree. Well, let's see what Henry says. Yeah, one of the standards is, if we took the yurt apart, is it equal to its parts? Let's just take that one. So if we took the yurt apart and piled it up on the ground... Which you can do with a yurt. Yeah, is it still a yurt? The question is, is it still a yurt? And nobody would say it's a yurt. So it's not equal to all its parts. It's not the same as the collection of all its parts, because if you take it apart... It somehow loses its greatness.

[62:35]

Okay, so then if we're looking at the inherently existing yurt, then you might jump to the other conclusion and say, again, you're skipping a step. You're skipping ahead to the reasoning. This is... Well, I was trying to clarify... That is what you said. What you said is true. And this is the point we're going to get into, actually. But before that, I think it's tempting to jump over this point, but I think it's an important... to clarify that if the yurt were inherently existent, if it were, it would have to be identical to its parts, or completely separate from its parts. What does it mean, identical to its parts? Identical means exactly the same. It would be its parts. Language is very difficult. Not like almost the same, but identical. It's not like the whole yurt is identical to each of its parts. It's like Those parts and only those parts are the yurt, and anything less than that is not the yurt.

[63:38]

Yeah, in this case, before we're going into Hemni's thing, which is going to play with this, yeah, right. So we could say the collection of every part together. That's usually, yeah, and we might see that. Anything taken out, it would not be the yurt. Yeah, the collection of all its parts, just all its parts included without anything removed. I don't think we even have to go that far. We are talking about this particular yurt, but we're not comparing it to other yurts, for example. I don't even know if we need to say there's no other yurt. There might be some other yurt that's identical to its parts, too.

[64:42]

but just looking at this particularly inherently existing yurt and its particular parts. I don't think we need to get into other yurts in this case. I'm not sure how you're saying. So if you take that door out and put another door in, it would still be the same yurt? Is that what you're saying? This is, again, this is starting to get into the reasonings that Henry was starting to bring up, and maybe we should just go there. because this point may be, people may not appreciate it, yeah. But it is said that this is important to understand this concept. It's in the definition, doesn't it? Definition of what? Definition of inherent existence means that this, what you just said about identical or separate. It's because of that definition. Yeah, we're looking at, I think what people are starting to do is they're starting to already see that there's not an inherently existing yurt because of these various reasons.

[65:46]

But this is kind of saying, we have to prove precisely that there can't be an inherently existing yurt. And in order to do that, we have to see that if there were an inherently existing yurt, any possible inherently existing yurt, it would have to exist in one of these two ways, and there's no alternatives to these two. And this is kind of a, it's a somewhat simple philosophical reasoning. It's about independence, um... It's about independence versus dependence. I think, like, it's a lot easier for me to, like, think about it in terms of just a human, like, um, is a human, like, chest, arms, you know, like... Well, this is what we're going to apply it to. We're going to... The yurt and its parts is basically, this is an example of the self and the skandhas is what it's going to come down to. But it's easier to do it first, actually, with the yurt.

[66:47]

It is said, and also I agree, yeah, it's a simpler thing because this is so dynamic, this person. Why is the first level of realization realizing that it's not the self? Interesting question, yeah, yeah, yeah. It has been brought up, no, they say, actually, I have come across that question in terms of this discussion. It's a little bit like maybe you're using the dharmas first, but then before you get into the full realisational impact of it, you start applying it to the Self. But yeah, it's kind of like seeing the emptiness of yurts first. But this particular thing about the whole and its parts, there's different reasonings, depending on co-arising kind of reasonings, but this particular thing of the whole and its parts particularly applies to the self or the person.

[67:57]

Like, you know, we have this other Nagarjuna class on the four... you know, neither rising from itself, nor from another, from both, from neither. That's another reasoning that you can, there's different, to prove emptiness, but it's a different reasoning. So this is, and they're all equally true and valid and equally subtle, actually. But this one particularly applies to the self of the person. So there's nothing, you're pretty much arguing there's nothing that exists independently. There's an example you can give of something unless there could be something independent if it were to be completely separate from its parts or completely the same. And the reason for agreeing to this proposition, which maybe is not that complicated, it's not something really deep, it's just saying, if it were independent, it couldn't depend on anything, so it would have to be the same or completely independent, completely separate.

[69:00]

And the reason for setting this up first to be convinced of that basic fact is that then when we say, well now, is the yurt, if the yurt were to be the same as its parts, it's going to have these problems. It won't work if it's exactly the same as its parts. And if it were completely different than its parts and unrelated to its parts, it's also going to have these problems. And we're going to prove in these two different ways how it can't be either these two extremes of separate or identical, and we see that it's not the two extremes, that's the moment of the realization that it can't exist. But unless you've decided beforehand, been completely convinced that if it were to exist, inherently it would have to exist in one of these ways, if we don't see that beforehand, and kind of have sort of almost embodied that kind of basic fact, that way when we start proving this way or this way, the impact of

[70:03]

the enlightenment at that time won't be that strong. So we'll just say like, oh, well, it's not this way, so maybe it's something like that. Or maybe it's in between, we haven't really worked it out. But if we know beforehand, this basic thing, that there's no in-between territory for the inherently existing yurt. There's nothing in between. If it were to inherently exist, it would have to be the extreme view of completely separate and independent, or completely identical. Reading Nargagino, the problem is there's a lot of assertions. This is an assertion. Yeah, it's an assertion. So it's more like a proposition that he goes on to prove, but it's not so... Not so much that he goes on to prove, but he uses it as a basis for proving the absence of the inherent existence. But there's nothing inherently obvious about these set of statements. There's no way that people go... Oh, yeah, well, I can see that. You can, no. No, I'd say it's obvious. You can see this. Maybe I'm just not talking about it well.

[71:04]

Well, the only reason I can understand this is because I've gone through the reasonings, and then once I go through the reasonings, then I understand... Well, this is before the reasonings. This is, they call it, I forget what they call this, this maxim kind of thing. Before you start reasoning, you set up the basis, you set up this... Yeah, so that's what we're doing now. That's what I'm trying to not skip ahead and do this step that it's not that hard to see. It's like the premise. It's a premise, yeah. But if you start with a premise that nobody can recognize as true, then you're in trouble. Exactly, I agree. But can we just recognize this? It's quite simple. There's nothing profound about this. I think we've been trained by like math to be there. If something were independent, independent means not dependent on anything, right? So forget about inherent existence in this case. Let's just talk about independent. If it were independent, it would have to be... Independent means separate, right? It means not connected, not related, not dependent.

[72:06]

Those are all synonyms. Not in relationship to. Not in relationship to. Those are all synonyms for dependence. It's... Yeah, so we can't... Maybe we can't imagine it because, well, how could there be such a thing? Well, that's the point. How could there be such a thing? We're starting... But if there were to be such a thing, so maybe this is why it's hard to get this, because we already know there's not such a thing. But if there were to be such a thing, it would have to be in these two ways. I think the issue that I find in this, is this really the way we take the self? You know, like when we have an experience of the self happening because of some emotion or some obstruction or some joy, and the self comes along with it. Are we experiencing it or imagining it to be one of these extremes? I don't know that we are. I think you could say the extreme would not be the separate... Well, the reasoning is what's hard to see how I think maybe we are. And maybe basically you could say it's the same identical one.

[73:07]

We think that actually we view the self as identical with body and mind. Oh, I see. That's it, right? So that's what this is going to come down to. If the inherently existent self... Well, we can try just going back to that example. If the self were to inherently exist, it would have to be identical to the body and mind, or completely separate and unrelated to the body and mind. This is why, from this point, it's actually easier to say. Okay, and so this is Nagarjuna's first verse, right? If the self were, and it was now going into the reasons, which maybe we can start. I'm sorry. Some schools say it's good. Yeah, it's separate. Yeah. And this is proving that separate doesn't work and the same doesn't work. Neither one works. This is the first verse. Well, I wasn't thinking in terms of philosophical or theological propositions.

[74:14]

I was thinking in terms of our ordinary everyday experience. Yeah, I think we do see this way. Yeah. I think we see it in one of these two ways, actually. We see it as... that sense of self is identical to the body and mind, or actually somehow separate from the body and mind. For example, the owner, remember we talked about the view of the self as the owner of body and mind, the possessor? If you start looking at that view, it has to be one of these two. And when you look at it, it's separate. The owner, if it were, the owner would be separate from the body and mind. The owner owns body and mind, so that's a view of the self being separate from body and mind, if you start studying that view of the owner. So these two can be expanded into other possibilities, like owner, or the self is in the body and mind, or the body and mind is in the self, and all these things can be broken into these two possibilities. If the self were to be identical with the aggregates of body and mind,

[75:23]

it would have to arise and cease, Nagarjuna says, because the body and mind arises and ceases. That's why we looked at the five aggregates, they arise and cease. If it were to be that extreme, it would have to arise and cease. If it were to be different, and in this case, different means completely separate, inherently, inherently separate, you have to understand it that way, from the body and mind, it would not have the characteristics of the body and mind, meaning like, it would be completely unrelated. It's kind of, so this, this view of the self being like this kind of universal soul or something, that's like, it would have to be completely, there'd be no relationship to the body and mind, so in a way then it doesn't make sense. For one thing, we couldn't know it with the mind, because as soon as the mind knows it, it's related again, right? It's dependent on the mind. So that one, you can see how that doesn't make sense, and get more intricate with these reasonings. And the other one, Maybe more commonly we see the other one, that we think it's the same as the body and mind, but the body and mind arises and ceases.

[76:30]

And that was, remember in Buddha's second teaching, very early basic teaching, he says, you know, that goes through the five skanas and they're impermanent. They arise and cease. The body and mind arises and ceases, so how could you grasp it as a self? That's his point, right? But this is kind of setting up the... the kind of philosophical reasoning so you can come to see really accurately how it can't be. See, now you might be able to see how that first step might have been important. I can imagine something that's inherently existed and yet can interact with things that are impermanent. But if you say independent, it can't interact. No, I'm saying inherent existence. Well, this is his question. It's not dependent upon, let's say, a soul. And I can just imagine this, and that's what we're trying to do here, is do an imagination. Let's say there's a soul, and yet that soul is inherently existence, not dependent on body and mind, but actually is affected by body and mind. In a way, that's... And it's dependent.

[77:31]

It's dependent, then, right? Anything it's affected by is dependent. But its existence is not dependent upon it. But it can interact. But then it's getting into this... It has some existence. What is its existence... You see, that kind of, that view, if you start looking at it, doesn't make sense, because you're saying there's this part of it that exists independently, but then part of it that's dependent and is affected by, you've kind of split it into two parts or something. Because of the object and the consciousness, is that what you're saying? Yeah, even if we know it with consciousness, even if we can experience it with the mind already, it's not independent anymore. Yeah, so that's maybe not a good example. Yeah.

[78:40]

Yeah. Well, let's not do it with a chair. Yeah. [...] Well, they both depend on mind, actually. This is all in terms of our experience. So they do depend on our perception of them to exist, in a way, actually. Since they're both dependent on mind, you can say, in terms of interdependence, you can say, That's how everything we perceive is interdependent because it's all dependent on mind and therefore related as mind objects.

[79:47]

But I think it is a good point that we could go there and say how they're dependent, but I think it's true that let's not even do that example. Let's forget about this one. It was just trying to take two objects and relate them, but I think that the more important one is the whole and its parts, the yurt and its parts. Or the classic example is a cart, or we could say a car and its parts, because a car has a function. You can do it just as well with the yurt, but it might be easier to see if it has all these little parts. And just as Henry was starting to say, when you start to look at these things, which you can do this week, do it with the yurt and its parts, or a car, or anything you can choose, anything with parts. Is there anything? Yeah. No, there's not. Yeah, there's not. But it's easier, I think, to see if you pick something more complex than like a rock, because a rock is made up of atoms and stuff, but it's not as lively as the yurt.

[80:55]

If you disassemble it, like Henry started to say, or somebody said, if you replace the door with a different door, it stops. Well, is it the same yurt then? But mainly if you start taking off the doors one by one and folding up, rolling up the stuff and folding it together, at some point it's just a pile of stuff. And then we say, well, it's still the folded up yurt. But we'll start taking the stuff and spreading it out all over Green Gulch. And put them all like 100 yards apart. Then where's the yurt? Where's the yurt spread all over Green Gulch? How can you spread a yurt around? Or the car, and you take all the nuts and bolts and spread them all across the whole country or something. Like, where's the car? What, don't they? We could say, well, we see the door out in the field out there, and we say it still has yurtness.

[81:56]

I don't know if we'd see it that way. You might not see it. If there was an essence of yurtness, if there was an essence of yurtness, it would keep it. But if there wasn't any essence of yurtness, if the yurt is a conventional designation dependent on its parts, this is what we were saying, the conventional self is a conceptual imputation dependent on its parts, dependent on the body and mind. What if the yurt were merely a nominal yurt, merely the name yurt, that we assign dependent on its parts, on this collection of parts. We conventionally call it the yurt to communicate about what it is. But when we look for it, we see it's just this name that suddenly appears when the parts are assembled. And then maybe it's hard, then we start attributing an essence, and we take the door down to the field, we say, oh, that's the yurt's door.

[83:03]

That's the self's body. But before we build the yurt and we just have all the pieces, we don't say the pieces of the yurt until the yurt, finally all the pieces come together and like, ta-da, it's a yurt. This might seem like a funny, quirky way of thinking, but if you start to look at this, you can see this is the reasoning that... you can see how the self is a conceptual imputation dependent on its parts. And it's a mere name for this collection of constantly changing stuff. So again, that's the snake on the road. The imaginary snake, in this case, is just a conceptual imputation. It's just an imagination that the mind imputes to talk about a yurt or a snake or a person. Completely made up by the mind.

[84:07]

There's no, but we really feel like it's a yurt, don't we? I mean, we're just in it. We're sitting in it. It's yurting. That's where my problem is with the whole thing, because I can very easily understand that yurt is a concept that we place when these parts are put together in this way, because I think it's easier... rather than thinking what would happen if we took them all and put them in a pile, because I think it would be pretty easy to think yurt in a pile. But if we took all these parts apart and built something completely different about it, then would we still call that a yurt? We could build, I don't know, we could build some, I don't know, a bridge. A bridge, yeah. Then it really loses its yurtness. Right, and now it has other, whatever this other thing is, I completely understand that yurt is a concept or self is a concept. Yeah. Yeah, like you're saying, but we are in a yurt. I mean, we can make up any name we want for it. It's really just a functional convention for us all to understand that this common place in construction is this thing.

[85:15]

Yeah. So that's why we don't negate the mere yurt, the nominal yurt, the nominal self. We don't need to refute this... this conventional term of this is me. We can keep that and use it. But notice how we think that it's more than that. This yurt is more than our conception of it. Don't we feel like there's really a yurt here? Other than our... This is what to look at. It's getting late, but one more... Oh, that's what you wanted to say. Yes. Yeah. So this is starting to get into this first verse, and you can contemplate this with yurts and cars and stuff. And pray strongly to my Jews.

[86:05]

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